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Abstract 
 
In Belgium labour-related disputes are treated by specialised courts with a 
particular composition. Besides professional judges, there are two lay judges 
appointed by the King, on the basis of a nomination made by the employers' 
associations and the trade unions.   
The Belgian labour Courts sprang from the Napoleonic conseils de prud’hommes. 
This system was abandoned  in 1926, when appellate tribunals were established 
and a legal assessor was added. In 1967 independently functioning labour courts 
were established, which were however construed as being part of the judiciary. 
Unlike Germany, no specialised Supreme Court was established. Instead, the 
Belgian Cour de Cassation was endowed with a social chamber. 
The choice in favour of  labour courts with lay judges, seems to reflects a 
majority tendency in Europe. Also in Germany, Hungary, Finland, Great Britain, 
Ireland and Sweden labour-related disputes are treated by courts with lay 
judges, nominated  by employers' associations and trade unions. In Italy and 
Spain separate labour courts exist, but they are solely composed of professional 
judges. Various reasons explain lay judges’ popularity: they are cheaper than 
professional judges, they provide professional knowledge and experience and 
they strengthen the confidence in the institutions. Furthermore, they enable 
citizens to supervise the functioning of the judicial system and contribute to the 
acceptability of the judicial decisions. Thus, the choice for lay judges relies also 
on other factors than those related to expertise.  
Although the functioning of the labour courts has never been seriously criticized, 
successive Ministers of Justice have tried to put  the dream of a unified judiciary 
into effect. Such a design still exists at the present day, though it seems that a 
political agreement of 31 March 2010 has alleviated the risk (at least temporary).  
The principle of including lay judges has at times been  questioned, 
predominantly based on the principle of  judicial impartiality. In an old judgment 
Langborger v. Sweden of 22 June 1989 concerning the nomination  of lay judges 
in a Housing and Tenancy Court by landlords’ and tenant associations, the 
European Court on Human Rights  ruled  that Article 6 of the Convention had 
been violated. However, the Court came to an different conclusion in Kellermann 
v. Sweden. It considered that in the absence of lay assessors’ interests contrary to 
those of the applicant, the Labour Court did not fail to meet the requirement of 
impartiality. In similar cases, the Belgian Cour de Cassation has recently refused 
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to withdraw a judge, nominated by a representative trade union, in a matter 
related to the nomination of candidates at the social elections, although such a 
right to nomination constitutes another prerogative of the representative trade 
unions. The nomination by a representative organisation was considered as not 
giving rise to any appearance of partiality. By his appointment the lay judge is no 
longer construed as a representative of his organisation, but becomes a member 
of the judiciary. 
 
Keywords: labour courts, lay judges, judgement by one's peers, due process 
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Lay judges in labour courts 
1 Introduction 
Whenever courts have to judge a case, they can invoke the assistance of one of 
more external experts. Still, there exist courts which don’t have to rely on 
external experts, because they have already experts among their members. This 
is also the case for the Belgian labour courts which lay assessors can be seen as 
internal experts, even though the choice for mixed courts with lay judges relies 
also on other factors than those related to expertise. In this paper the history, 
merits and challenges of the mixed system are analysed. 
2 The origins of mixed courts 
2.1 From Napoleon to Van Reephingen 
 
The Belgian labour Courts sprang from the Napoleonic conseils de prud’hommes. 
Like in France, the werkrechtersraden were initially established to prevent 
workers from instituting legal action against their employers for regular courts, 
as employers wanted them to be “un veritable palladium pour les fabricants 
contre les exigencies souvent injustes de leurs ouvriers »1. Although the first 
bodies were installed in 1810, only since 1859 they consisted of an equal number 
of workers’ and employers’ representatives. Meant to pursue reconciliation, 
judgements were rare2. Over the years the werkrechtersraden underwent many 
changes. Finally, the French model was abandoned in 1926, when appellate 
tribunals were established and a legal assessor was added3.  
In the 1950 the proliferation of bodies having jurisdiction for labour and social 
security disputes compelled for a reform. Royal Commissioner Van Reepinghen’s  
project of the new Code judiciaire aimed to integrate these bodies within the 
judiciary. However, Van Reepinghen did not assign the competence for both civil 
procedures and labour law disputes to a single judge, like the kantonrechter in 
                                                 
1 S. SCHOLL, “De Gentse Werkrechtersraad de oudste van België (1810-1889)”, 
Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der Gentse Arbeidsbeweging, Brussel, 1957, 227, geciteerd 
in J. F. DEKEERSMAECKER, “Van werkrechtersraad naar arbeidsrechtbank” in X, “30 jaar 
Belgische arbeidsverhoudingen”, Belgische Vereniging voor Arbeidsverhoudingen, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1977, 322. 
2 H. LENAERTS, Sociaal Procesrecht, Gent, E. STORY-SCIENTIA, 1968, 49-50. 
3 J. F. DEKEERSMAECKER, “Van werkrechtersraad naar arbeidsrechtbank” in X, “30 jaar 
Belgische arbeidsverhoudingen”, Belgische Vereniging voor Arbeidsverhoudingen, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1977, 327. 
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the Netherlands4. Labour-related disputes would be treated in separate 
chambers, but workers and their unions were not convinced that the project 
would guarantee sufficient protection5. In 1967 a compromise was reached. It 
sought to establish independently functioning labour courts, which were 
however construed as being part of the judiciary. The chosen option resembles 
the German system. Yet, no specialised Supreme Court with workers’ and 
employers’ representatives was established6. Instead, the Belgian Cour de 
Cassation was endowed with a social chamber which is solely composed of 
professional judges.  
Apart from the social chamber of the Cour de Cassation, all Belgian labour 
tribunals and courts consist of both professional judges and lay judges. In every 
labour tribunal or court two lay judges are appointed by the King, on the basis of 
a nomination made by the employers' and workers’ associations. The nomination 
procedure substituted the original objective to elect the lay judges every six 
years which in practice had happened only twice in forty years7 and to which 
Van Reepinghen was opposed8.  
2.2 Explaining the choice for lay judges  
The choice in favour of  labour courts with lay judges, seems to reflects a 
majority tendency in Europe. Also in Germany, Hungary, Finland9, Great Britain, 
Ireland and Sweden10 labour-related disputes are treated by courts with lay 
judges, nominated  by employers' associations and trade unions; although each 
legal system has its own particularities for competence, appeal, access to justice 
and participation of lay judges. By contrast, in Italy and Spain separate labour 
courts exist, but they are solely composed of professional judges. 
How can the popularity of lay judges in labour courts be explained? In composing 
courts out of professional judges and lay judges two perceptions of  fair trail are 
conciliated: on the one hand the right to be judged by one’s equals or peers, and 
on the other the right to be judged by an impartial third party. Whereas in the 
                                                 
4 L.P. ASSCHER-VONK, W.H.A.C.M. BOUWENS and H.L. BAKELS, Schets van het 
Nederlandse arbeidsrecht, Deventer, Kluwer, 2007, 181; C.J. LOONSTRA and W.A. 
ZONDAG, Arbeidsrechtelijke themata, Den Haag, Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2006, 44; C.J. 
LOONSTRA, “De kantonrechter als arbeidsrechter”, Deventer, Kluwer, 2000, 46 p. 
5
 H. LENAERTS, Sociaal Procesrecht, Gent, E. STORY-SCIENTIA, 1968, 87-88. 
6 M. WEISS and M. SCHMIDT, Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Germany, Kluwer 
Law International, 2008, 149-152; www.bundesarbeitsgericht.de. 
7 J. F. DEKEERSMAECKER, “Van werkrechtersraad naar arbeidsrechtbank” in X, “30 jaar 
Belgische arbeidsverhoudingen”, Belgische Vereniging voor Arbeidsverhoudingen, 
Deventer, Kluwer, 1977, 331-332. 
8
 
8
 H. LENAERTS, Sociaal Procesrecht, Gent, E. STORY-SCIENTIA, 1968, 107. 
9 A. J. SUVIRANTA, Labour Law in Finland, Kluwer Law International, 2000, 126-127; 
www.oikeus.fi/tyotuomioistuin. 
10 R. FAHLBECK and B. J. MULDER, Labour and Employment Law in Sweden, Juristförlaget 
i Lund, 2008, 90-91; www.arbetsdomstolen.se. 
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former perception the judge is seen as an equal with a practical knowledge, in 
the latter he is considered as a delegate of a supreme authority who applies the 
law by virtue of his profession11. This principles not only influenced the labour 
courts. In majority of countries mixed systems exits with professional judges, 
assisted by assessors who are part of judiciary, thus guarantying the uniformity 
and equality of the judicial function.  
M. STORME identifies four types of  assessors:  
- assessors representing the people, ordinary citizens who exemplify the idea of 
democratisation and restore trust in the judiciary;  
- assessors representing a specific profession, like professional corporations and 
lay assessors of the tribunal du commerce;  
- assessors representing the various economic and social groups with conflicting 
interests, like lay assessors in labour tribunals and courts;  
- experts in the field, like the assessors in Italy, Poland and the Netherlands, who 
help the tribunal to make a decision based upon a sound knowledge without the 
necessity to hire external expertise.  
Although recourse to lay judges occurs in different kinds of disputes, the author 
stretches one common denominator: a functional link between the judicial 
organisation, judicial competence, civil procedure and the participation of lay 
judges in the administration of the judiciary. Therefore, the courts are 
characterized by a specific competence and a simplification of the procedure12. 
This can clearly be seen in labour courts as the finality of labour law to 
compensate for inequality leaded to special features like a right of the workers 
and employers to defend themselves, the right of the worker to be represented 
by a union delegate and proper rules of procedure which aim at making the 
access to justice easier and less expensive13.  
B. FRYDMAN indicates the advantages of lay judges: they are cheaper than 
professional judges, they provide professional knowledge and experience and 
they strengthen the confidence in the institutions. Furthermore, they enable 
citizens to supervise the functioning of the judicial system and contribute to the 
acceptability of the judicial decisions14. J. ALLARD describes lay judges as a 
cooperation between the judicial world and the civil society. By their presence 
                                                 
11 B. FRYDMAN, “Juge professionnel et juge citoyen: l’échevinage à la croisée de deux 
cultures judiciaires” in X, La participation du citoyen à l’administration de la justice”, Les 
cahiers de l’Institut d’études sur la justice, no. 8, Brussels, Bruylant, 2006, p. 19-20. 
12 M. STORME, “L’Europe judiciaire vers une laïcisation du statut judiciaire ? », Journ. 
Proc. 2003, nr. 467, 6-7. 
13 F. SCHOENAERS in X, La participation du citoyen à l’administration de la justice”, Les 
cahiers de l’Institut d’études sur la justice, no. 8, Brussels, Bruylant, 2006, p. 163-164. 
14 B. FRYDMAN, “Juge professionnel et juge citoyen: l’échevinage à la croisée de deux 
cultures judiciaires” in X, La participation du citoyen à l’administration de la justice”, Les 
cahiers de l’Institut d’études sur la justice, no. 8, Brussels, Bruylant, 2006, p. 22-26. 
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lay judges will contribute to a better decision and a more positive perception of 
the judiciary15. Thus, the choice for lay judges relies also on other factors than 
those related to  expertise. 
3 The labours courts challenged 
3.1 The ghost of an integrated judiciary 
Although in Belgium the functioning of the labour courts has never been 
seriously criticized, successive Ministers of Justice have tried to put Van 
Reepinghen’s dream of an integrated judiciary dream of into effect16. Such a 
design still exists at the present day, though it seems that a political agreement of 
31 March 2010 has alleviated the risk at least temporary, since the judicial 
reform is an issue in the negotiations for the formation of a new government. 
Workers’ and employers’ organisation remain vigilant as the election winning 
Flemish separatist party, N-VA, refused to endorse the March agreement. On the 
15th of September, in the National Labour Council a new, second, advice in favour 
of independent labour courts was formulated (nr. 1741), repeating the position 
expressed in the first advice from the 15th of December 2009 (nr. 1716).  
The initiative of the social partners was no isolated incident since also other 
labour law experts expressed their concern about the future place of the labour 
courts within the judiciary. This difference of opinion between labour lawyers 
and other practitioners of law has to be noted. A labour law expert shall rarely 
advocate for a more extensive integration of the labour courts into the judiciary, 
while other practitioners of law usually will not support the autonomy of the 
labour courts.  
The same is true for the role of lay judges. Whereas labour law circles are likely 
to defend the key role of lay judges, other lawyers feel some reticence towards 
lay judges. VELU questions whether citizens have more confidence in tribunals 
and courts with non-professional judges. In his opinion non-professional judges 
received no adequate training, have insufficient experience and enjoy no 
freedom of conscience because of their economic and social dependence of the 
organisation by which they were nominated17. Still, other authors strike a more 
positive note18.  
                                                 
15 J. ALLARD, “Un consensus en faveur des juridictions mixtes”, Journ. Proc. 2003, nr. 468, 
p. 7. 
16 H. LENAERTS, “1970-2000: het dertigjarig bestaan en de toekomst van de 
arbeidsgerechten. Zijn de arbeidsgerechten aan vernieuwing toe? Juridisch-historische 
benadering”, Soc. Kron. 2000, 1, p. 1-4. 
17 VELU, “Représentation et pouvoir judiciaire”, Journ. Proc. 1996, p. 639-640. 
18 J. ALLARD, “Un consensus en faveur des juridictions mixtes”, Journ. Proc. 2003, nr. 468, 
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3.2  There is no such thing as an impartial lay judge ...  
Before the courts the principle of including lay judges has seldom been 
questioned. The rare attempts to attack the principle have been based on the 
principle of judicial impartiality19.  
In an old judgment Langborger v. Sweden of 22 June 1989 the nomination of lay 
judges in a Housing and Tenancy Court by landlords’ and tenant associations was 
examined in the light of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The circumstances of the 
case can briefly be described as follows. Lease contracts concerning apartments 
in the Stockholm region usually comprise a negation clause making the rent 
dependable of an agreement between a local landlords’ and tenants’ union. The 
applicant was dissatisfied with the rent and the commission of 0.3 % on the rent 
he had to pay to the tenants’ union, so he proposed to the landlord the 
conclusion of a new agreement with a fixed rent and no negation clause. Since his 
offer was rejected, the applicant brought the dispute before the Rent Review 
Board which was composed of a judge/chairman and two lay assessors, 
nominated by the Swedish Federation of Property Owners and the National 
Tenants’ Union. The applicant challenged the two lay assessors’ objectivity and 
impartiality, but the challenge was rejected. He appealed in vain to the Housing 
and Tenancy Court, a body with a similar composition of two judges and two lay 
assessors, and to the Supreme Court.  
Before the European Court of Human Rights the applicant argued that the 
proposal to delete the negotiation clause from the lease threatened the interests 
of both organisations since they derived their very existence from rent 
negotiations. Both the Commission and the Court followed his argumentation. 
The Court noted an appearance of partiality as the lay assessors had been 
nominated by, and had close links with, two associations with an interest in the 
continued existence of the negotiation clause. Therefore, the applicant could 
legitimately fear that they had a common interest contrary to his own and that 
the balance of interests, inherent in the Housing and Tenancy Court’s 
composition in other cases, was liable to be upset when the court came to decide 
his own claim (§ 35).  
This outcome may look somewhat surprising. The Court emphasises that there is 
no reason to doubt the personal impartiality of lay assessors. Nevertheless,  it 
makes an association between the nomination by an organisation and the 
existence of close links with that organisation. Subsequently, this nomination is 
presumed to be a prejudice, because of the appearance of impartiality it could 
                                                                                                                                            
6-7. 
19 J. HUBIN, “Les règles d’organisation judiciaire des juridictions du travail de Belgique 
une paradoxale mais adéquate spécificité”, in X, La participation du citoyen à 
l’administration de la justice”, Les cahiers de l’Institut d’études sur la justice, no. 8, 
Brussels, Bruylant, 2006, p. 134-143. 
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create. Furthermore, the Court ignored the fact that the two lay judges were 
counterbalanced by two professional judges, of which the president has a casting 
voice in case of no majority decision, and the absence of instructions by the 
organisations which have nominated the lay judges, who sit in their personal 
capacity, and not as representatives of the organisations. 
In a rare comment on the case, J. ANDREWS observes the underlying recognition 
of the Court which perceived the two associations to have a vested interest in the 
existing negotiation procedure since they derive their existence from the process 
of negotiation while this procedure is disputed. The author assumes that in other 
disputes, like the level of rent, the balanced representation would be a fair one. 
He links the case to the established jurisdiction of the Court which has, even 
when there is no reason to believe that individual assessors in case were biased,  
repeatedly recognised that the issue of impartiality must be measured not only 
in the subjective context of the judge in the given case, but also it must be 
subjected to an objective test seeking to ensure that there are sufficient 
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt respecting the issue of impartiality. 
Thus, it can be construed as an elaboration of the Common law principle that 
justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done20.  
Be that as it may, the Court must have sensed that it skated on thin ice as with 
this rigid interpretation of the principle of impartiality all national courts with 
lay assessors which are nominated by social or economic associations were 
menaced. 
 
Consequently, in a more recent judgement of 26 October 2004, Kellermann v. 
Sweden the Court explicitly distinguished from Langborger v. Sweden. In this case 
the applicant company alleged that, on account of the composition of the Labour 
Court, it did not have had a fair trial hearing by an impartial tribunal, as required 
by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The company, which was not a member of any 
employers’ organisation and had refused to sign an agreement of its own, 
instituted proceedings against the union LO which had taken industrial action, 
claiming that this industrial action was unlawful. Before Labour Court, the 
applicant company challenged its composition of two legally trained and 
qualified judges and five lay assessors, two of which had been nominated by 
employers’ associations and two by employees’ associations. The challenge was 
rejected by a bench of the Labour Court composed of members not representing 
labour market interests and by the Supreme Court.  
Before the European Court of Human Rights the applicant company challenged 
the objective impartiality of the Labour Court, arguing that one of the lay 
assessors was a member of LO and that all lay assessors have had a (common) 
interest which conflicted with its interests. As in the Langborger case, the Court 
                                                 
20 J. ANDREWS, “Impartial tribunals in Sweden”, E.L. Rev. 1990, 15(1), p. 94-95. 
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examined whether the balance of interests in the composition of the Labour 
Court was upset and, if so, whether any such lack of balance would result in the 
court failing to satisfy the requirement of impartiality in the determination of the 
particular dispute before it. The Court first notes that one of the four lay 
assessors disagreed with the majority’s findings, so it could not be said that there 
was an interest common to all for lay assessors. Furthermore, the Court 
considered that the nature of the dispute between the applicant and the union 
was such that the lay assessors’ interests could not be contrary to those of the 
applicant and it would be wrong to assume that their views on these objective 
issues would be affected by their belonging to one or other of the nominating 
bodies (§ 67).  
S. GUINCHARD points out that the Court initially had accepted an objective 
concept of impartiality, but that over the years it orientated itself towards a more 
subjective approach in which the appearance no longer suffices to constitute 
partiality21. Must this decision be understood as an application of this evolution? 
I am inclined not to think so, because in this case the Court paid no attention to 
the refining of the concept of impartiality. The Court merely resumed the thread 
where it had left it in het Langborger case, with its question whether the balance 
of interests in the composition of the Labour Court was upset, and if so, whether 
any such lack of balance would result in the court failing to satisfy the 
requirement of impartiality in the determination of the particular dispute before 
it. Such a criterion tends to make the impartiality of nominated lay judges 
dependent on the nature of the case which could lead to legal uncertainty. 
Therefore, will not dispel all the suspicion towards assessors nominated by 
social or economic associations. Could there be an alternative? 
3.3  ... or can a nominated lay judge be impartial? 
Some months before the Court’s decision in the Kellermann case, a case involving 
the impartiality of lay judges was brought before the labour tribunal of 
Nivelles22, as two trade unions initiated proceedings against a company 
unwilling to install a works council. In this proceedings the company asked for 
the withdrawal of every lay judge, member of one of the trade unions. The 
tribunal rejected the request on the grounds that there is no subordination 
between the lay judge and the trade union by which he was nominated and that 
his presence is counter-balanced by the presence of the lay judge nominated by 
the employers’ organisation.   
                                                 
21 S. GUINCHARD, “Indépendance et impartialité du juge. Les principes de droit 
fondamental », in J. VAN COMPERNOLLE and G. TARZIA (eds.), L’impartialité du juge et 
de l’arbitre, Brussels, Bruylant, 2006, p. 24-28. 
22 Trib. Trav. Nivelles 16 april 2004, A.R. nr. 78/N/2004 – 79/N/2005, J.T. 2004, p. 557. 
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Four years later, the lay judges in the labour tribunals and courts were again 
challenged in disputes about the election of works councils. This time, their 
withdrawal was not asked by employers, but by members of the political party 
Vlaams Belang. The latter succeeded the Vlaams Blok, when some of his 
representatives had been convicted for racism. The members contested the 
refusal of their employer to accept them as candidates for elections of works 
council. In Belgium, only candidates nominated by trade unions can be eligible 
for the works councils, while trade union policies tend to exclude active 
members of Vlaams Belang from membership. As candidate lists has to be post 
up by the employers, the Vlaams Belang took advantage of this procedure to 
question the trade union prerogatives, without calling the trade unions into the 
case, as is foreseen in disputes concerning the election of works councils23.  
Before the Labour Tribunals of Brussels, Bruges and Tongres could treat the 
cases, the Labour Courts of Brussels, Ghent and Antwerp had to decide on the 
demand to withdrawn the lay judges nominated by the workers’ organisations 
on the grounds of an appearance of partiality and high level of hostility.  
The Labour Courts of Brussels24 and Ghent25 considered the demands in a 
different composition, with lay judges nominated by organisations of self-
employed people instead of workers’ organisations. Both courts rejected the 
demand to withdraw the lay judge. The Labour Court of Antwerp was composed 
in a normal way, with two lay judges, one of which was nominated by a workers’ 
organisation. As the withdrawal of this lay judge was demanded, the question 
was transferred to the Cour de Cassation.  
Like the Labour Courts of Brussels and Ghent, the Cour de Cassation was 
convinced that there were no reasons to withdraw the lay judge26. The Court 
found no ground in the legislation to withdraw the lay judge since this 
nomination is prescribed by the Code judiciaire. There could be no problem of 
impartiality, because the lay judge exercises his judicial function independently 
and is no representative of one of the workers’ organizations. The Court denied 
the existence of a high level of hostility between the lay judge and the applicant 
as there was no proof of any personal hostility of the lay judge. 
It has to be noted that although the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Right were enlisted in the procedures, both the labour courts and the Cour de 
Cassation came to a different conclusion, which was obviously in line with the 
position held by the Swedish Supreme Court in the Langborger case. 
                                                 
23 The cases are discussed at length in I. VAN HIEL, “Waarom alleen representatieve 
werknemersorganisaties kandidaten bij de sociale verkiezingen mogen voordragen”, Or. 
2009, nr. 5, 126-138. 
24 Arbh. Brussel, 29 april 2008, A.R. nr. 50.880 and Arbh. Brussel, 29 april 2008, A.R. nr. 
50.881. 
25 Arbh. Gent 29 april 2008, A.R. nr. 08/083. 
26 Cass. 2 juni 2008, A.R. nr. C.08.0215.N; Cass. 2 juni 2008, A.R. nr. C.08.0216.N. 
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4 Summary and conclusions 
In Belgium labour-related disputes are treated by specialised courts with a 
particular composition. Besides professional judges, there are two lay judges 
appointed by the King, on the basis of a nomination made by the employers' 
associations and the trade unions.  This model can be found in many other 
European countries, like Finland, Germany, Great-Britain, Hungary, Ireland and 
Sweden. Lay judges can be seen as internal experts, but that is not their only role. 
Their proximity to the belligerents is just as important. Yet, this proximity could 
raise questions about their impartiality. If impartiality is defined as the absence 
of an appearance of impartiality, a nomination by an organisation could easily 
give cause to suspicion, even in the absence of any prejudice by the lay judge who 
is no lap dog of the organisation which has nominated him. This approach could 
easily discredit an institution already challenged by a pursuit of uniformity and 
legal professionalism. Ultimately, it ignores the advantages and accomplishments 
this institution has for both workers and employers. “In a democratic judicial 
system it must be admitted that justice is done by professional judges, assisted 
by non professional judges, coming from organisations defending opposite 
interests and who in a collegial way give a solution to a conflict that is adapted to 
reality”, like the labour tribunal of Nivelles said 27.  
 
                                                 
27 This is a translation of the French text. 
